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Genital surgery is one of the most controversial and contested practices, yet it is frequently 
described and referred to with little or no attention to cultural and social context. This 
article examines the practice, performed on both men and women, and the extent to which it 
clashes with issues of consent and capacity, as well as multicultural concepts of toleration 
for minority group practices. It then questions why female genital surgery, unlike male 
genital surgery, is legally prohibited in Australia. It argues that such legal gender bias stems 
from a liberal conception of “tolerance” and the limits of consent in Australia, placing 
female genital surgery in an “unacceptable” category and male genital surgery in an 
“acceptable” category. 
Introduction 
The issue of genital surgery has sparked heated 
debate in Australia,1 and while this article does not 
condone it or deny its deleterious effects, it does 
attempt to situate it within a cultural context. It is a 
practice performed on both men and women to 
different extents and for a variety of reasons: 
religious, cultural, political, sexual and health-related. 
It is an act that is controversial for both the law and 
the medical establishment to deal with since it 
clashes, at times, with issues of consent and 
capacity as well as challenging the extent of 
multicultural concepts of toleration for minority 
group practices.2 Most controversially, female 
genital surgery is legally prohibited yet male surgery 
 
1 See recent articles in the press, such as R Milson, “Off the 
Cut”, Sun-Herald Magazine, 23 July 2000, p 29; J Van 
Tiggelen, “Losing It”, Good Weekend, 26 August 2000, p 
27;  
N Briger, “The Unkindest Cut”, Marie Claire Magazine, 
Sept 2000, p 62. 
2 G Hage, “Locating Multiculturalism’s Other: A Critique of 
Practical Tolerance” (1991) 24 New Formations 19. 
is not – despite heavy criticism of the latter.3 This 
article argues that such legal gender bias stems from 
a liberal conception of “tolerance” and the limits of 
consent in Australia. Thus, female genital surgery is 
not viewed as an “acceptable” minority practice but 
male genital surgery is. This article reaches this 
conclusion by first examining the practice of female 
genital surgery and then assessing its legal 
ramifications in Australia. This is followed by a 
similar survey of male genital surgery and a final 
section which assesses the divergent status 
accorded to each in Australian law and society. 
Female genital surgery 
Definitional debates 
Female genital surgery is heavily criticised4 and 
 
3 C Price, “Male Non-therapeutic Circumcision: The Legal 
and Ethical Issues” in G Denniston, F Mansfield Hodges and  
M Milos, Male and Female Circumcision (Plenum 
Publishers, New York, 1999). 
4 Key critics include F P Hosken, The Hosken Report: 
Genital and Sexual Mutilation of Females (4th ed, Women's 
International Network, Lexington, 1993); N Toubia, 
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most commonly referred to as “female genital 
mutilation” (FGM). For example, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) formerly referred to the practice 
as “female circumcision” but changed this to “female 
genital mutilation” at its 1990 Addis Abeba 
Conference. The altered terminology was said to 
carry “heavier moral weight”.5 “Circumcision” may 
indeed be an inaccurate term. However, the label 
“female genital mutilation”, as well as the discourse 
surrounding it, is also unsatisfactory for a numb er of 
reasons.6  
First, it designates women who have undergone 
any form of genital surgery as “mutilated” – a term 
that some women would not use in their own self-
perception: 
“When I see myself, that area is neat and smooth. 
This is how it should be, not exposed and ugly.”7 
To be branded as a “mutilated woman” and a “victim 
of mutilation” can be perceived as both insulting 
and embarrassing. It denies spheres of autonomy 
and power and tends to situate women only as 
subordinates.8 Conversely, many women remember 
the ritual as an empowering “coming of age” and 
excitedly anticipate the ritual for their own 
daughters.9 Though this is not to deny the agony it 
frequently entails, such as described by the 
Egyptian women’s activist and doctor, Nawal El 
Saadawi,10 such pain is often deeply repressed or 
turned into a means of strength and pride. Thus, 
frequently “it is not viewed by those participating in 
it as an ethical issue or an immoral act”.11 As an 
                                                                                               
Female Genital Mutilation: A Call for Global Action (2nd 
ed, RAINBO, New York, 1995). 
5 Cited in A Davis, “Female Genital Mutilation: Some 
Ethical Questions” (1998) 17 Medicine and Law 143. 
6 See also N M Gordon, “'Tonguing the Body’: Placing 
Female Circumcision Within African Feminist Discourse” 
(1997) 25 Issue: A Journal of Opinion 24. 
7 Author’s interview, Khadija, Asmara, Eritrea, 22 October 
1999. 
8 Compare the comments of C Mohanty, “Under Western 
Eyes” in C Mohanty, A Russo, L Torres (eds), Third World 
Women and the Politics of Feminism  (Indiana Press, 
Bloomington, 1991). 
9 E Early, Baladi Women of Cairo: Playing with an Egg and 
a Stone (American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1993),  
pp 102-106. 
10 N El Saadawi, The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in Arab 
World (Zed Books, London, 1980), pp 7-11. 
11 Davis, op cit n 5, at 145. 
important submission to the Family Law Council of 
Australia explained: 
“These practices, however distasteful or unjust 
to a Western audience, are based on traditions on 
which women have built and created their whole 
meaning of life and identity, both as individuals 
and part of their society. For some of these 
women, their female strength and identity may 
partly come from the pain and difficulty which 
female genital mutilation causes, making them 
‘strong’ and ‘desirable’ women.”12 
Robertson’s research on the Kikuyu peoples of 
Kenya found exactly this.13 Genital surgery, varying 
from minor cuts to clitoridectomy, was central to 
female initiation. This initiation into adult life led to 
the reception of knowledge and wisdom from 
respected elders and entailed special treatment of 
girls during the initiation period. Girls entered into a 
realm of power separate from men and forged intense 
solidarity both as a group and also between the 
initiated girl and the female elder who “held” her 
during the ceremony. Girls were imbued with a sense 
of “triumph” and “empowerment” that stayed with 
them for life. The practice gradually faded out among 
this particular group due to collective female labour 
action that evolved into new forms of women’s 
groups, leading to the decline in initiation 
ceremonies and associated genital surgery. 
Amongst the Chamus of Kenya the initiation 
process, involving clitoridectomy, is still practised 
as an integral part of contemporary Chamus culture. 
Kawai found that “[t]he ordeal is a source of 
invaluable pride to the girl. Elderly women still take 
pride in their brave attitude many years before.”14  
Secondly, without denying the adverse effects of 
female genital surgery, it is important to recognise 
that the term “mutilation” stems from a neo-colonial 
narrative that views genital surgery, and the people 
 
12 Cited in B Hughes, “Female Genital Mutilation: The 
Complementary Roles of Education and Legislation in 
Combating the Practice in Australia” (1995) 3 JLM 202 at 
205. 
13 C Robertson, “Grassroots in Kenya: Women, Genital 
Mutilation and Collect ive Action, 1920-1990” (1996) 21 
Signs 615. 
14 K Kawai, “Women's Age Categories in a Male-dominated 
Society: The Case of the Chamus in Kenya” in E Kurimoto 
and  
S Simonse, Conflict, Age and Power in North East Africa 
(James Currey, Oxford, 1998), p 161. 
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involved with it, as “barbaric and uncivilised”. The 
following statements are apt in this regard: 
“[F]emale circumcision is a totally heinous thing. 
It is impossible to find a single circumstance in 
which such a barbaric procedure could be 
justified in a civilised society such as ours.”15 
“The primitive attitude to female circumcision 
rests not only on tradition, but also on the male 
desire for the female to be pure for him… That is 
not only the most cruel, but also ... the most 
primitive, and the most important aspect of the 
matter we should reject.”16 
This approach is not grounded in the lived 
experiences of many women, and although often 
benevolent, it creates an artificial and hierarchical 
division between “us” (Western, civilised) and 
“them” (primitive, barbaric). Such divisions do 
nothing to alter existing cultural tensions and 
misunderstandings and stifle useful and 
constructive cross-cultural dialogue. As Gunning 
pointed out: 
“[T]he ‘us helping them’ approach has created an 
enormous amount of bitterness in non-Western 
feminists for whom the attitude is chillingly 
reminiscent of colonialism.”17  
Thirdly, the “FGM” label does not do justice to 
the many varieties of genital surgery, that range from 
minor ritual acts to severe infibulations. “FGM” is a 
broad “cover all” that attempts to narrowly define 
and sensationalise the practice. In order to explain 
its complexity, the next section examines the 
varieties of female genital surgery. 
The practice 
Female genital surgery is practised predominantly 
in parts of Africa, the Middle East and Asia. It is 
frequently linked to religion, though it predated 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and is also practised 
among some animist groups. Islam is the only 
religion which stipulates any limited grounding for 
the practice. According to Abu-Sahlieh, this comes 
 
15 Baroness Masham, cited in K Hayter, “Female 
Circumcision – Is There a Legal Solution?” (1984) Journal 
of Social Welfare Law 323 at 324 (emphasis added). 
16 Ibid at 325 (emphasis added). 
17 I R Gunning, “Arrogant Perception, World-travelling and 
Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital 
Surgeries” (1991) 23 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
189 at 200. 
from a several sources including a hadith relating to 
a conversation between the Prophet Mohammed and 
an exciser, Um Habibah, after she emigrated with him 
to Medina. Upon asking her if she still continued the 
art, she replied that she did unless he forbade it. The 
Prophet said to her: 
“Cut slightly and do not over-do it [ash-immi wa-
la tanhaki] because it is more pleasant [ahza] for 
the woman and better [ahab] for the husband.”18  
However, in terms of Islamic jurisprudence, this 
source (and several others also invoked) are of 
questionable authority and weight.19 Most Muslims 
choose not to practise genital surgery and many 
who do, do so incorrectly in the belief that it is 
written in the Qur’an. As illiteracy is prevalent in 
many regions where genital surgery is performed, 
neither women nor men have access to the Qur’an 
themselves. Female genital surgery is therefore a 
predominantly traditional cultural practice – existing 
in areas where religion spread and was grafted onto 
old traditional practices. It is practised for 
multifarious reasons: to ensure cleanliness and 
hygiene, to control female sexual urges and 
prostitution, to indicate initiation into adulthood, to 
express religious faith, to ensure virginity upon 
marriage, and to guarantee chastity in a husband’s 
absence. 
Four main categories of genital surgery exist:  
1. ritualised genital surgery is the least severe and 
can amount to as little as a symbolic act of 
cleaning the clitoris; at other times the clitoris is 
scraped or nicked.  
2. The second and intermediate form is commonly 
termed sunna (tradition) and involves the 
removal of the clitoral hood and at times the 
glands of the clitoris.  
3. The third is excision and usually involves 
removing the whole clitoris.  
4. The fourth and most severe is infibulation or 
“Pharaonic” genital surgery. This involves 
removing all of the external female genitalia and 
sewing the remaining edges together with a 
small passage for menstruation and urination. 
 
18 Cited in S A A Abu-Sahlieh, “To Mutilate in the Name of 
Jehovah or Allah: Legitimisation of Male and Female 
Circumcision” (1994) 13 Medicine and Law 575 at 581. 
19 The author thanks Jamila Hussain, Lecturer in Law, 
University of Technology Sydney, for her useful comments 
in this regard. See also J Hussain, Islamic Law and Society 
(Federation Press, Sydney, 1999), p 132. 
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As a practice in Africa, it is predominantly 
performed by a midwife in unsanitary conditions 
and with implements varying from knives to 
sharp rocks and glass. However, in some 
circumstances, as in Somalia and Egypt, health 
professionals have been known to perform the 
procedure in clinics.20 
The impact of female genital surgery has been 
increasingly documented. A recent Australian study 
of complications relating to genital surgery 
highlighted dyspareunia, apareunia, dysmenorrhoea, 
urinary tract and vaginal infections and labour 
difficulties.21 Other studies point to the possibly 
extensive psychological damages caused by the 
practice, though this is less adequately documented. 
At the same time, whilst it can eliminate sexual 
feeling and pleasure (and make intercourse 
agonising or impossible), other studies have shown 
that this is not uniform: “an unpredictable response 
from women who cannot, at least according to 
Western medical discourse, enjoy the act.”22 A 
study by Lightfoot-Klein of infibulated women in the 
Sudan found: 
“[C]lose to 90% of women (by their own report) 
were orgasmic, ranging from always to 
occasionally and from intense to mild. Many were 
able to give vivid and convincing descriptions of 
their orgasms and to credibly ascribe frequency 
of occurrence.”23  
A 1985 Egyptian study found that 25 per cent of 
infibulated women could still attain orgasm through 
stimulation to the clitoral area, as opposed to 50 per 
cent of women who had not had genital surgery.24 
The extent of sexual damage is therefore extremely 
difficult to assess and is widely debated. 
 
20 M A Dirie et al, “A Hospital Study of the Complications 
of Female Circumcision” (1991) 21 Tropical Doctor 146; 
Australian Family Law Council, Female Genital Mutilation: 
Discussion Paper (1994), p 8. 
21 R Knight, C Bayly and S Grover, “Female Genital 
Mutilation – Experience of the Royal Women's Hospital, 
Melbourne” (1999) 39 Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 50. 
22 V Kirby, “On the Cutting Edge: Feminism and 
Clitoridectomy” (1987) 5 Australian Feminist Studies 35 at 
44. 
23 H Lightfoot-Klein, “Pharaonic Circumcision of Females 
in the Sudan” (1983) 2 Medical Law 353 at 357. 
24 M Badawi, “Epidemiology of Female Sexual Castration in 
Cairo, Egypt” (1987) The Truth Seeker 32. 
The age of genital surgery varies from newborn 
girls (as with nomads in Sudan) to seven-year-old 
girls (Egypt) or to those prior to menstruation. In 
Tanzania and Kenya, clitoridectomies are performed 
amongst some groups on a woman’s wedding night. 
Other groups, such as the Ibo in Nigeria, perform 
surgery prior to marriage. Another Nigerian 
community, the Aboh, do the same before the birth 
of a woman’s first child.25 
All these variations – in geographical locations, 
reasons for the procedure, the type of procedure 
performed and age – exemplify the global complexity 
of female genital surgery. Accordingly, we need to 
bear this in mind when examining the situation in 
Australia, since essentialising and stereotyping the 
procedure is common amongst health professionals, 
law-makers and society.  
Female genital surgery in Australia 
Australia has a growing population of immigrants 
from areas that practise female genital surgery.26 
However, there are no data on the extent of the 
practice in Australia; nor on the number of girls 
taken overseas for the performance of the act. 
Likewise, there is only limited research on the topic 
in the Australian context.27 However, several legal 
issues and initiatives exist in relation to both 
international and domestic law and it is therefore 
necessary to examine each in turn. 
International obligations 
International human rights norms remain centred 
on individual rights. As such, it is a controversial 
regime that fails to consider the more community-
based nature of non-Western cultures, especially 
those in Africa, the Middle East and Asia.28 Female 
 
25 E Dorkenoo, “Combating Female Genital Mutilation: An 
Agenda for the Next Decade” (1999) 1 and 2 Women's 
Studies Quarterly 89. 
26 See Table 5, “Immigrants to Australia from Countries 
with a High Prevalence of Female Genital Mutilation (1985-
1996)” in Knight et al, op cit n 21, at 53. 
27 M Dopico, “Hear Me Talk”, Unpublished Honours 
Dissertation (Department of Social Work, James Cook 
University, 1996). 
28 Gunning, op cit n 17, at 239; see also discussion in A 
Funder, “De Minimis Non Curat Lex: The Clitoris, Culture 
and the Law” (1993) 3 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 417. 
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genital surgery, though not usually specifically 
mentioned, appears to breach the various covenants 
of international organisations: the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948);29 the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (1979);30 and the 
Declaration on Violence Against Women (1993).31 
The issue of female genital surgery has also been 
raised in the context of the United Nations 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
refugee applications in Australia. In 1997 the 
Refugee Review Tribunal recognised the threat of 
imminent genital surgery that a mother and her 18-
month-old daughter faced if they were forced to 
return to Nigeria. The tribunal explained:  
“[T]he female circumcision feared by the 
Applicant is not an operation that is tailored to 
her personally in the way that an operation for 
the excision of a melanoma or the removal of a 
rotten tooth is directed at an individual 
personally for the amelioration of a particular 
problem. There is nothing about female 
circumcision which will be beneficial or medically 
desirable for either the Applicant or her daughter: 
indeed, the opposite is true.”32 
As a result, the tribunal held that both mother and 
daughter were refugees and had a well-founded fear 
of persecution, that is, “female genital mutilation”.33 
It appears that such applications may increase as 
awareness of the grounds for refugee applications 
are more widely circulated among regions practising 
female genital surgery.34 
Legislative issues 
Some Australian States and Territories have 
enacted amendments to existing legislation 
prohibiting “female genital mutilation”, while others 
believe the existing Criminal Codes amply cover the 
 
29 Articles 3 and 5. 
30 Articles 10, 12(1) and (2), 16(1). 
31 Article 2(a) does specifically state that FGM constitutes 
violence against women.   
32 Refugee Review Tribunal Reference V97/06156  
(3 Nov 1997) (Tribunal member, Sue Zelinka). 
33 See another case of a Somalian family that was rejected on 
similar grounds: Refugee Review Tribunal Reference 
N98/23544 and N98/23541 (7 Aug 1998) (Tribunal 
member, Chris Keher). 
34 See also Refugee Review Tribunal Reference N98/22461  
(8 Jan 1999). 
issue.35 In New South Wales the Crimes (Female 
Genital Mutilation) Amendment Act 1994 (NSW) 
was achieved after a long discussion process and 
recommendations by the Australian Family Law 
Council.36 Section 45 stipulates: 
“(1) A person who: 
(a) excises, infibulates or otherwise mutilates the 
whole or any part of the labia majora or labia 
minora or clitoris of another person; or 
(b) aids, abets, counsels or procures a person to 
perform any of those acts on another person,  
is liable to imprisonment for seven years.” 
Section 45(5), as with other comparable Acts 
relating to FGM, makes it clear that consent is not a 
defence to the charge. Distinguished from “female 
genital mutilation” are surgical procedures deemed 
necessary for the health of a person; performed 
during or after labour; and sexual reassignment. 
Other States, such as South Australia,37 Victoria38 
and the Australian Capital Territory,39 also allow the 
court to make an order preventing a person from 
removing a child from the State; seizing the child’s 
passport and subjecting her to “periodic 
examination” to ensure surgery has not taken place. 
Victoria enacted similar terminology, no doubt to 
prevent what happened in February 1994 when an 
action took place between a father and the 
Department of Health and Community Services in 
the Children’s Court of Victoria. The Department 
was seeking care and protection orders against the 
father due to physical abuse. The activist group, 
Women Lawyers Against Female Genital Mutilation, 
was granted friend of the court (amicus curiae) 
status in this matter and obtained evidence that the 
abuse included infibulation of both girls. However, 
because infibulation took place outside Australia, 
the court was unable to make an order specifically 
addressing this abuse.40  
 
35 A Rahman and N Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A 
Guide to Law and Policies Worldwide (Zed Books, New 
York, 2000), pp 102-106. 
36 Australian Family Law Council, op cit n 20.  
37 Children's Protection Act 1993 (SA), s 26B(1), (2), (3), (4) 
and (5). 
38 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 33. 
39 Crimes (Amendment) Act (No 3) 1995 (ACT), s 92X(1), 
(2); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 92X. 
40 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality Before the 
Law: Women’s Equality, Report 69, Pt II, para 7.27 (AGPS, 
Canberra, 1994) 
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The discussion processes that led to the 
implementation of the legislation in each State and 
Territory are marred by the fact that some vital 
opinions were omitted due to linguistic and 
institutional barriers. Many women originating from 
regions that perform genital surgery are not 
accustomed to discussing this issue in public or 
indeed in English, and some faced the additional 
trauma of arriving as refugees.41 One informant, 
when discussing the issue of making written 
submissions or discussing genital surgery for the 
sake of possibly enacting legislation, had this to 
say: 
“I would never discuss this issue in public, it is 
not right to talk about it like that. It is a personal 
matter, for our women.”42  
Some informants originated from states with 
repressive political institutions where it is 
unacceptable to discuss family and personal issues 
for fear of government reprisal. Female genital 
surgery has been banned by certain regimes in the 
past, including some colonial regimes, and therefore 
is interpreted as part of repressive imperialism. 
British colonial rule in the Sudan, for example, 
enacted ineffective prohibition on all forms of female 
genital surgery in 1946. The result was not only anti-
colonial rumblings under the leadership of 
Mahmoud Mohammad Taha but an increased 
urgency and reduced age for the infibulation of 
girls.43 Some of these feelings persist in Australia, 
and thus the imposition of change can be perceived 
as a type of cultural imperialism from the dominant 
“Anglo” majority power in Australia: an attitude of 
“‘we’ will ‘civilise’ you because we know and live 
the truth”.44 Thus, the Ecumenical Migration Centre 
argued that legislation was not appropriate for 
addressing the dilemma of female genital surgery in 
Australia, since it makes “affected women feel 
 
41 E Pittaway, Refugee Women – Still at Risk in Australia: A 
Study of the First Two Years of Resettlement in the Sydney 
Metropolitan Area (AGPS, Canberra, 1991). 
42 Author's interview, M B, Sydney, 1999 (emphasis added). 
43 Lightfoot-Klein, op cit n 23, at 254. 
44 “Legal Penalties Not the Right Way to Go, Says the 
Ecumenical Migration Centre” (1994) 32 (5) Law Society 
Journal 70 at 71. 
rejected and self-conscious – as if they had a 
disease”.45  
Despite these reservations, the legislation has 
been enacted but commentators emphasise that it 
“alone is insufficient. It should be accompanied by 
appropriate community-based action.”46 Such action 
is well under way in parts of Australia, but many 
activists are critical of the legislation: 
“Does it mean a white woman can have her labia 
trimmed for cosmetic reasons but a Somalian 
Australian woman cannot because that would be 
female genital mutilation?”47 
This leads to the conundrum of the legislation 
making the issue a racial one. It is often assumed, if a 
woman is of African descent or, indeed, Muslim, that 
she is circumcised:  
“[M]any [Western] women’s studies students 
may know nothing more about African women and 
assumed that all or most African women are genitally 
mutilated.”48 
In turn, as Mmaskepe Sejoe explained, health 
professionals often assume that circumcised women 
must be “a mindless vessel to be used and 
abused”.49 It is for this reason that many circumcised 
women can find the racism they experience in 
relation to their condition worse than the condition 
itself. Some therefore avoid doctors and health 
practitioners for fear of ridicule and embarrassment.50 
Additionally, such legislation means that a 
mother, grandmother and community “exciser” 
(those normally involved in female genital surgery) 
would face imprisonment. A girl, already injured due 
to the procedure, would therefore face the public 
uproar surrounding such a case and lose her most 
vital (female) support network. In short, the 
legis lation suggests “that women who permit the 
operation are incompetent and abusive mothers 
who, in some ways, do not love their children”.51 
 
45 Ibid. 
46 Dorkenoo, op cit n 25, at 94. 
47 Author's telephone contact, Mmaskepe Sejoe, Co-
ordinator, Family and Reproductive Rights Program, 
Department of Human Services, Melbourne, 7 June 2000. 
48 Robertson, op cit n 13, at 615. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Author’s telephone contact, Mansura Dopico, Feb 2000. 
See  
n 27. 
51 K Boulware-Miller, “Female Circumcision: Challenges to 
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Common law: Capacity and consent 
Even in the absence of legislation in, for example, 
Western Australia, Queensland, Tasmania and the 
Northern Territory, certain directives would need to 
be examined. Consent is the most central concept 
since “all medical treatment is preceded by the 
patient’s choice to undergo it”.52 Without consent, 
even the “least touching” (such as medical 
treatment) amounts to the tort of battery. Consent 
may be implied53 or express (verbally or through a 
consent form), but a person must have the requisite 
age and intelligence in order to consent to battery.54  
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Service Authority55 held that the rights of parents 
decline as a child becomes older and more 
competent. More crucially, Secretary, Department of 
Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB56 
held that children, even if intellectually disabled, 
have the right to provide real and informed consent 
to medical procedures. However, if the child is 
incompetent and the medical treatment is non-
therapeutic, then approval must be sought from the 
Family Court of Australia or the Supreme Court.57 
Conversely, if the child cannot give consent, but the 
procedure is in the best interests of the child,58 
parental consent is sufficient to negate actions 
pertaining to assault and battery.59 However, the 
majority in Marion’s Case identified clitoridectomy 
as an example of a medical treatment that is 
prohibited by law irrespective of parental consent.60  
These basic tenets raise significant problems 
                                                                                               
the Practice as a Human Rights Violation” (1985) 8 Harvard 
Women's Law Journal 155 at 166. 
52 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 489. 
53 As in an emergency situation, where a patient is 
unconscious or in a situation where a patient puts forth his 
or her arm to receive an injection: O'Brien v Cunard  SS Co 
28 NE 266 (1891). 
54 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal 
Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871. 
55 [1986] AC 112. 
56 (1992) 175 CLR 218 (Marion’s Case). 
57 Ibid at 249, 263. 
58 Ibid at 240. 
59 J Devereux, “The Capacity of a Child in Australia to 
Consent to Medical Treatment – Gillick Revisited?” (1991) 
11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 283. 
60 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services 
v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 275. 
when we analyse their impact in relation to female 
genital surgery. If parents consent to genital surgery 
and take the child to a regis tered medical 
practitioner, how does the law address this? First, 
the Australian Medical Association has explicitly 
stated that any medical practitioner found to have 
performed the procedure would be deregistered. 
Secondly, it would appear that the principle in 
Marion’s Case would apply, that is, the surgery is 
not, on face value, in the best interests of the child 
and is of no therapeutic benefit; and it seems certain 
that the Family Court or Supreme Court would not 
grant an approval for the procedure. However, the 
cultural significance of genital surgery is that it is a 
rite of passage into adulthood and in most societies 
where it is practised, women cannot marry if they are 
not circumcised. A girl who is not circumcised may 
be ostracised in her community in Australia and not 
accepted in her country of origin if she visits or 
returns to live or, indeed, marry. What, therefore, is 
in the “best” interest of the child, and by what 
standards are we to judge what is “best”? 
Regardless of these problematic moral and cultural 
questions, in Australia the “best interests of the 
child” are most certainly judged in light of Western 
liberal traditions. Thus, individual bodily integrity 
overrides cultural considerations of what a girl’s 
“best interest” may be. Thus, parents cannot 
consent to their daughter’s genital surgery and 
neither could a doctor perform such a procedure. 
Despite the cultural tension this creates, the author 
agrees with this approach and feels that the 
legislation, despite its faults, is also right to protect 
minors from female genital surgery. 
However, a significant issue arises when 
differentiating between a minor and an adult. If a 
sound-minded adult woman (for example, prior to or, 
indeed, after marriage) voluntarily wants to be 
circumcised, perhaps in the less intrusive sunna 
form, where does she stand in respect of the law? 
Consent is fulfilled, so therefore, as Mackay 
discussed, “there must be some important difference 
between female circumcision and other forms of 
surgical operations”61 to differentiate it from, for 
example, cosmetic surgery, sexual realignment or 
male circumcision. How is a woman’s choice to have 
 
61 R D Mackay, “Is Female Circumcision Unlawful?” [1983] 
Criminal Law Review 717 at 719. 
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her clitoral hood removed (sunna) different from a 
woman’s choice to have breast implant surgery or 
labia trimming? Consent to all three forms of surgery 
derives from social conceptions of how a woman’s 
body should appear; and all are “unnecessary” 
surgery that causes significant pain and scarring. 
Sunna genital surgery, breast surgery and labia 
trimming have associated risks. Breast surgery (such 
as enlargement, reduction, nipple alteration) can 
reduce overall breast and nipple sensitivity and lead 
to lowered self-image and sexual fulfilment. Similarly, 
labia trimming has been known to have associated 
complications and can leave women feeling 
physically unsatisfied with the outcome of the 
procedure.62 Therefore, as Parekh argued:  
“[I]t is difficult to see in the name of what right 
we may tell an adult woman in full possession of 
her senses that her uncoerced demand for 
clitoridectomy is unacceptable.”63  
As Marion’s Case highlights, the choices of a 
sound-minded adult should “be respected and 
accepted, irrespective of what others, including 
doctors, may think is in the best interest of a 
particular person”.64  
However, others would argue that a person 
cannot consent to such an act, and that although 
women may voluntarily wish to undergo the 
practice, they are not aware of the “deleterious 
complications” resulting from genital surgery.65 Or, 
they may be coerced by community or familial 
pressure. However, if a woman is acting voluntarily 
and is aware of the complications and risks involved, 
how do we differentiate genital surgery from, say, 
cosmetic surgery, tattooing or body piercing?66 
Indeed, it falls into issues surrounding the limits of 
consent, especially with regard to acts seen as 
 
62 Personal correspondence, Dr G B, Consultant 
Gynaecologist, Royal Hospital for Women, Sydney, 7 June 
2000. See  
Items 35530 and 35533 in the Medicare Benefits Schedule, 
2000. 
63 B Parekh, “Minority Practices and Principles of 
Toleration” (1996) 30 International Migration Review 258. 
64 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services 
v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 309; see also 
Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321. 
65 Davis, op cit n 5, at 147. 
66 See A J Watkins, “Score and Pierce: Crimes of Fashion? 
Body Alteration and Consent to Assault” (1998) 28 Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review 371. 
“perverse”. The decision of the House of Lords in R 
v Brown67 indicated that consent can be a defence to 
certain potentially criminal acts such as surgery, 
male circumcision, tattooing, ear piercing and 
boxing. The case then considered consensual sado-
masochistic activity in light of this and held by a 
three-to-two majority that participants could not 
consent to this form of harm. It appears, therefore, 
that the House of Lords found such behaviour 
“intolerable as a matter of public morality”.68 Female 
genital surgery in adult women would be likely to fall 
into this category – though it is yet to be challenged 
in the Australian courts. This is discriminatory and 
prejudicial and demonstrates that consent, as a 
concept, is determined not only by culture but, 
indeed, as we shall now discuss, by gender. 
Male genital surgery 
Male genital surgery has been practised in 
Australia as both a religious ritual of the Jewish and 
Muslim communities and to promote male health. 
Muslim communities view circumcision as 
compulsory for males, closely linking it to both 
purity and cleanliness for prayer.69 Male Jewish 
infants are circumcised seven days after birth, 
though this is not universally practised and has 
been questioned by some Jewish scholars.70 
Although it is not prohibited in Australia, the 
Australian Medical Association does not encourage 
the practice, and a great deal of medical opinion 
openly opposes it.71 Complications can include 
damage to the shaft and urethra, amputation, 
urethral fistulas, infection, haemorrhage, misshapen 
appearances, loss of sexual stimulation,72 problems 
with mother-child bonding and, extremely rarely, 
death. In light of such possible outcomes and the 
fact that there is no medical benefit, Brigman argued 
that male genital surgery should be included in the 
 
67 [1993] 2 WLR 556. 
68 I Freckelton, “Masochism, Self-mutilation and the Limits 
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69 Abu-Sahlieh, op cit n 18. 
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Perspective (Vanguard Publications, Boston, 1997). 
71 N Williams, “Complications of Circumcision” (1993) 80 
British Journal of Surgery 1231; C Howard, 
“Acetaminophen Analgesia in Neonatal Circumcision: The 
Effects of Pain” (1994) 93 Paediatrics 641. 
72 Abu-Sahlieh, op cit n 18, at 575. 
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definition of child abuse.73 Despite this, an estimated 
25 per cent of infant boys are circumcised in 
Australia at present,74 and neo-natal circumcision is 
covered by Medicare.75 Unlike female genital 
surgery, there is no prohibition on male genital 
surgery in minors or adults and some commentators 
continue actively to encourage it.76 
Issues of consent 
Again, as with the genital surgery of infant girls, 
consent is also at issue with infant males. In 
Marion’s Case, the majority excluded female 
clitoridectomy from the ambit of parental consent; 
however, Deane J referred to male genital surgery, 
positioning it squarely within the scope of parental 
consent for religious and hygienic reasons.77 Within 
this discourse, we need to understand that parental 
consent must be informed consent or a medical 
practitioner may be liable in negligence.78 Thus, 
parents must be informed of the risks associated 
with male genital surgery; otherwise, as with St 
Margaret’s Hospital of Women (Sydney) v 
McKibbin,79 an infant may be found to have been 
negligently circumcised. 
Again, as with female genital surgery, issues of 
well-being, such as emotional, moral and spiritual 
health, are considered to be within the scope of a 
child’s welfare.80 As Haberfield explained: “a Jewish 
or Muslim son who is not circumcised may feel 
psychologically and spiritually alienated from his 
culture and religion.”81 It appears that, in the case of 
infant male circumcision, these more spiritual and 
cultural considerations trump issues of infant bodily 
integrity and inability to consent. 
Since a child cannot be consulted and the 
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process is painful and unnecessary at birth, such 
decisions should only be made by an adult male. As 
with adult female surgery, an adult male in full 
possession of his senses should be able voluntarily 
to elect to be circumcised. This may make sense if a 
man, as an adolescent or as he develops sexually, 
experiences some form of sexual dysfunction or 
discomfort due to his foreskin; or, indeed, has a 
psychological desire to be circumcised. In such a 
case, circumcision would be a medical remedy or 
option. 
Male and female genital surgery: Why 
the differences? 
The common distinction between the two 
practices is based on the degree of risk and harm 
involved.82 However, the sunna type of female 
genital surgery is broadly equated with male genital 
surgery by a number of commentators.83 If this is so, 
how can this form of female genital surgery be 
prohibited for all women yet male genital surgery 
remain legally sanctioned for all men? As Richards 
argued: 
“[I]t is illogical that male circumcision has not 
been considered with [female genital mutilation] 
prohibition. Surgical cutting and disfiguring of a 
healthy genital organ is consistent with male and 
female circumcision ... the differences appear to 
be based largely on socially constructed ideals, 
and not on facts, it is suggested there should be 
no distinction based purely on gender.”84 
Hayter, in the context of female genital surgery in the 
United Kingdom, asked the following:  
“[W]hat justification is required before minority 
groups should be legally compelled to 
discontinue practices which are fundamental to 
their culture[?]”85  
In Australia the answer to this question appears to 
lie in the dominant societal conception of what 
minority practices are “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable”. Male genital surgery was prevalent 
 
82 Ibid at 381. 
83 D Richards, “Male Circumcision: Medical or Ritual?” 
(1996) 3 JLM 371 at 372; Parekh, op cit n 63, at 268; 
United Nations Centre for Human Rights, Harmful 
Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and 
Children, Fact Sheet No 23 (Geneva, 1995), p 8. 
84 Richards, op cit n 83, at 372-373. 
85 Hayter, op cit n 15, at 323. 
 Exorcising Excision: Medico-Legal Issues Arising From Male and Female Genital Surgery in Australia 
August 2001 67 
in Australia (and other Western liberal countries) for 
a great length of time as it is not viewed as 
“barbaric” and “savage” in the same way that female 
genital surgery is. It is perceived as far more easy to 
accommodate into Western liberal tradition. Female 
genital surgery has only a very minor role in the 
Western liberal tradition – clitoridectomies were at 
one stage performed on “hysterical” and “over-
sexed women”.86 However, it was never routine and 
uniform in the way male genital surgery was. There 
is also a strong religious connection with male 
circumcision, and freedom of religion is a central 
constitutional tenet. This is significant in the 
conceptualisations of male and female genital 
surgery, as Povenmire argued: “[e]thnocentric 
distinctions between the ‘barbaric’ practice of FGM, 
and the ‘meaningful’ practice of Jewish circumcision, 
facilitated this distinction.”87 
There is also less desire to control the male body 
in the way the female body is monitored and 
regulated by the state. Thus, on one hand, female 
genital surgery is frequently seen as a method for 
the monitoring of “irresponsible” female sexuality.88 
On the other hand, the debate, legislation and uproar 
over female genital surgery in Australia is also about 
 
controlling the female body. As one informant 
observed:  
“I feel confused by the attitude here. I was not 
circumcised at home due to the war [between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia], and when I came here I 
started hearing about how it [female genital 
surgery] is a terrible and savage practice. That 
women have no control or power over their 
bodies or sexuality. Now that I am older, I would 
like to be circumcised before I marry, but I can’t 
because it is illegal. Does this mean I cannot 
chose either way? It is my body.”89 
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Conclusions 
This article does not condone female genital 
surgery; rather it interrogates the discourse that 
condemns it in Australia. As such, it seriously 
questions the way in which the current legislation 
prohibiting female genital surgery was constructed 
and its possible effectiveness in eliminating the 
practice. This is especially true in respect of adult 
women who are prohibited to consent to such 
surgery by the legislation. By contrast, an adult male 
can consent to male genital surgery for any reason 
he chooses. More importantly, parents can consent 
to genital surgery for their infant son, leaving 
serious questions unanswered. How can the rights 
of a child with relation to genital surgery remain 
gender-based? The only answer is that it persists for 
the same reason that the rights of an adult to 
consent to genital surgery remain gender-based: that 
is, certain minority practices are tolerated as 
acceptable within the rubric of dominant liberal 
values in Australia and others are not. The law 
simply reflects this dominant cultural blueprint to the 
detriment of alternative minority rights and opinions. 
However, a more prolonged impact on infants is that 
among communities practising male and female 
genital surgery, the two are elided as acceptable and, 
in an unintended way, the current Australian 
legislation encourages this: 
“Female circumcision will never stop as long as 
male circumcision is going on. How do you 
expect to convince an African father to leave his 
daughter uncircumcised as long as you let him do 
it to his son?90 
Changes are required to educate against both 
male and female infant genital surgery whilst also 
amending the existing legislation in order to permit 
adult consent to such procedures. This both 
protects children and allows freedom of minority 
practices when a person is old enough to voluntarily 
and freely decide for himself or herself. In the long 
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